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BOOK REVIEWS
The Case Against Oligopoly: A New
Perspective
ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY.
By John M. Blair. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.,
1972, Pp. xix, 742. $16.95.
Since the face-off between the robber barons and the muckrak-
ers in the Nineteenth Century, Americans have confronted in-
dustrial size with alternating moods of hostility, awe, disgust, and
veneration. The worker who blasts dehumanizing assembly lines
stands fascinated with the horsepower and rpm's of the automobile
he uses to get to and from the plant. An unsatiated appetite for
whatever comes off the assembly line of the corporate giants is bal-
anced by the uneasy feeling that in fact the products feed a shallow
lifestyle fashioned by martini-guzzling New York hucksters. Those
committed to reform read with approval the newspaper account of
the most recent Nader attack before thumbing with trepidation to
the latest stock market quotations on General Motors and ITT.
Campaigns of corporate aggrandizement have always attracted
a wide assortment of camp followers, with politicians and academics
among the most persistent. To the politician, corporate size is a
convenient and headline-provoking punching bag (and, during elec-
tion time, a plentiful source of funding), while many a professor has
established a reputation-and made money-by criticizing, extol-
ling, or analyzing its various components. In a series of public hear-
ings, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, with
Dr. John Blair as chief economist, produced a subdued blend of both
callings. Drawing heavily but not exclusively from the record of
these hearings,' Economic Concentration: Structure, Behavior and
Public Policy is Blair's statement on corporate size.
Blair argues that the factors that once constituted the raison
d'etre for corporate size-efficiency, technology, innovation, and
managerial economics-are either inoperative, at the point of di-
1. Blair's chief source material comes from reports and records of hearings conducted
during the years 1957-1971. J. BLAIR, ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION: STRUCTURE, BEHAVIOR AND
PUBLIC POICy, Appendix 1 (1972).
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minishing returns, or outright debilitating. In the face of this
erosion, the drift towards an oligopolized market structure in which
a few corporations control most of an entire industry continues una-
bated. In identifying reasons for the movement, Blair points an
accusing finger at the past and continuing trend of acquisitions, the
increasing instances of non-price methods of competition, particu-
larly television advertising, the reliance by corporations on various
forms of predatory conduct, and a cross-purposes intrusion into the
marketplace by government. The consequence of these develop-
ments is a poorly performing economic system characterized by
noncompetitive pricing and an unresponsive allocation of resources.
Dr. Blair has put together an encompassing profile of the pre-
vailing arguments against industrial concentration. While the argu-
ments and the sources are familiar, the blend is distinctively the
author's. What emerges is a multi-dimensional view of the issues
and counterarguments concerning economic concentration-a mix-
ture of statistics, economic theory, history, and even a measure of
industrial sociology from self-styled business authority and best-
selling author, Robert Townsend. In a field susceptible to emotion-
alism and fanatical prejudice, Blair makes an effort to maintain an
even balance by acknowledging a number of competing points of
view.
Any effort, however, to touch all bases of a complex and contro-
versial subject like concentration runs a high risk of leaving gaps of
superficiality. While maintaining for the most part maximum levels
of thoroughness, Economic Concentration does not escape without
instances of "thin" treatment. One example is Blair's case support-
ing the assertion that advertising-particularly television advertis-
ing-"is among the most important causes of concentration. .. .
The vital threshold issue whether television has a superior capabil-
ity over the other forms of media in grabbing hold of consumers is
brushed aside by Blair with the remark that "this is one of the issues
that need not be resolved here."'3 Having made this quick assump-
tion, he further assumes-without convincing support-that the
effectiveness of television advertising is best measured by the level
2. Id. at 308.
3. Id. at 312. He continues: "Suffice it to say, as compared to the trends for the other
media, the upward movement in the use and costs of TV advertising makes it clear that it
has come to be regarded by manufacturers of branded and trademarked consumer products
as the preferred form of advertising. The preemption by large firms of the medium whose
supply is fixed and which, in addition, has the greatest pulling power should make higher
concentration almost a certainty." Id. at 312-13.
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of cash expenditures placed in the medium by advertisers. Referring
to statistics showing a correlation between increased expenditures
for television advertising and enhanced concentration, Blair then
jumps to the conclusion that television advertising is one of the
prime contributors to oligopolization.
Recent experiences in the cigarette industry following the con-
gressional ban on radio and television advertising shake, if not un-
dercut, Blair's judgment on the superior "pulling power" of televi-
sion advertising. After imposition of the ban, cigarette consumption
defied conventional wisdom by increasing three percent.' Not only
was there an upswing, but it occurred in the face of an overall thirty
percent reduction in the industry-wide advertising budget. As one
observer conservatively summarized, "[t]here are a couple of ob-
vious conclusions": television is not the fantastic advertising me-
dium it is supposed to be and the power of advertising itself has
been substantially overstated.5
The point registered by the cigarette experience-and one into
which Dr. Blair does not delve-is that cash expenditures constitute
an unreliable indicator of the efficacy of advertising. As John Wana-
maker once lamented, "I know half the money I spend on advertis-
ing is wasted, but I can never find out which half."I There is a wide
range of reasons for Wanamaker's dilemma. One problem is classifi-
cation: is, for example, packaging considered advertising? Would
the costs of a consummable package be considered an advertising
expenditure? Quaker Oats intends to print an educational program
for pre-school children on the back of its Life brand cereal pack-
ages 7 -is this advertising? Another example is the use of premiums
which in some industries, including breakfast cereals, is the primary
ingredient in the marketing mix.8 Again the question arises whether
this is an advertising expense.
Another problem with relying indiscriminately on the statistics
of the advertising budget is that the cross-utilization by advertisers
of intuition, creative instinct, and refined technique produces an
uneven performance chart that may not be consistent with the sup-
porting budget. Cash expenditures fail, for instance, to represent
the payoff from "positioning," or advertisements directed toward a
4. Gartner, Bring Back Cigaret Commercials, Wall Street Journal, Feb. 28, 1972, at 12,
col. 4.
5. Id.
6. Quoted in M. MAYER, MADISON AvEuE, U.S.A. 259 (Cardinal ed. 1959).
7. Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 18, 1973, at 11-A, col. 4.
8. See Dougherty, Battle of the Breakfast Table, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1972, § 3, at 1.
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particular portion of the market.' The "successful" ad and the
"bomb" look the same on an expense sheet." Unpredictable tools
like motivational research may achieve results far in excess of their
expenses or may be a total waste of resources-whatever happened
to the Edsel?
These and other non-quantifiable variables constitute the elu-
sive mainstream of advertising. Conditioned by a long-standing
commitment to the mathematical purity of statistics, many econo-
mists are instinctively repelled by the dark currents of the unfath-
omable, and thus opt to stay close to the more conceptually-
manageable cash expenditure figures of the balance sheet. This is
unfortunate; tunnel vision inevitably produces myopic solutions
such as Blair's proposal to provide small firms with equal access to
television or to allocate advertising time by lottery. Access to televi-
sion by chance (What if Procter & Gamble hits a lucky streak?) or
by regulatory decree is meaningless unless the advertiser can afford
the talents of a top-flight advertising agency. Of course, this prob-
lem can be solved by extending the scope of Blair's proposal to
include access to the services of ad agencies by decree or lottery as
well. Moreover, without tailored time scheduling, access alone
would by no means assure a payoff; it would be a waste of money
for a bra manufacturer to advertise during the Saturday morning
children's cartoons. In brief, any effort to ration television access to
an undefined and open-ended classification of "big" and "small"
firms in the face of finite time limitations would result in exponen-
tial chaos.
As a frame of reference for remedial action against concentra-
tion, Blair points to the free enterprise ethic, a process "guided by
the 'unseen hand' of competition,"" and evolving with appropriate
but minimal interference by government. The proposed remedies to
correct present imperfections are intended to revive the impersonal
allocative forces in the market place: deoligopolization, embargoes
on merger activity by large firms, equal access to television advertis-
ing for small firms, strict enforcement of antitrust laws, revision of
government buying policies to the detriment of dominant compa-
nies, repeal of tariff restrictions, and amendment of tax laws to
benefit small companies.
The New York Times Book Review Section critically surveyed
9. See Kwitny, 'Positioning' Ads, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
10. See General Foods Is Five Billion Particulars, FORTUNE, Mar. 1964, at 163.
11. J. BLAre, supra note 1, at 615.
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Blair's list of remedies with the comment that "[t]here is nothing
really objectionable about the proposals, but they do suggest a cer-
tain naivete about the resourcefulness of the American entrepre-
neur."'' 2 Businessmen will do what they have always done: find some
way to subvert government efforts to restrict them. A more critical
deficiency was seen in Blair's failure to cut through surface issues
like economic concentration to reach the fundamental problem of
"the inequitable distribution of income in America." 3 Even if
Blair's remedies successfully restore "free enterprise" in the United
States, society will be only imperceptively better off." Thus Blair's
handling of the causes and consequences of concentration is not in
issue; what is questioned is his use of the free enterprise model as a
frame of reference for evaluating and guiding the aspirations of the
economic system. The Times review thereby cuts through to the
dominant issue in contemporary economic thought-the growing
disenchantment with the leadership and teachings of the free enter-
prise model.'5
Blair takes a conventional free enterprise view of the economic
ideal: under the most productive conditions, prices respond freely
to a competitive interplay of supply and demand. Except to ensure
that abnormal deviations do not blunt or interfere with the deter-
ministic self-correcting pressures of the system, government's pri-
mary role is to remain generally aloof. Blair obviously feels that
industrial concentration is the most egregious deviation from ideal
conditions and that the distortion is now of such dimension as to be
completely invulnerable to private self-correcting forces. Implicit in
this view is the assumption that atomization and the consequent
revival of the ideal will produce a socially beneficial allocation of
resources, including an equitable distribution of income.
The attack on the use of free enterprise as a model comes in two
strains. A popular theme is that the imperatives of modern technol-
12. Lee and Passell, Economic Concentration, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1972, § 7 (Book
Review), at 32.
13. Id. at 34.
14. "Total elimination of monopoly profits, even if every penny were diverted to poor
people, would do relatively little to alter the lives of the bottom quarter of the population.
For that matter, competitive markets offer no such redistribution. Most monopoly-power
profits are transfers from middle class consumers to wealthy stockholders; the virtues of
forcing the price of a Buick down by $200 would be entirely lost on Mississippi sharecrop-
pers." Id.
15. As one observer concludes, "[Tioday the costs of competition may well be under
the heaviest scrutiny since the Industrial Revolution." Brodley, Massive Industrial Size,




ogy have irreversibly wrenched the economy from the conventional
assumptions of self-correction. Madison Avenue, upon orders from
the technocrats in industry and government and aided by sociolo-
gists and psychologists, has appropriated consumer sovereignty.
The guiding force behind the invisible hand in Blair's model-profit
maximization-has been seduced by the sirens of the technostruc-
ture and the planning functions in society.1" If the free enterprise
model has any vitality left, it is to serve as a placatory symbol to
the Consciousness II types who "babbitize" each other at the Rotary
and Kiwanis.
Other critics take a less benign view of the free enterprise
model. What disturbs them is not the patent disengagement of the
model from reality, but instead the conscious use of it by capitalists
as a facade for evil purposes. The notion that the marketplace is
susceptible to an automatic self-correcting process is seen as a de-
luding cloak used to justify and explain away dehumanizing assem-
bly lines, poverty, racial discrimination, and rape of the environ-
ment. A repugnant feature of the system is the perpetuation of a
morally corrupt ethos that debases the human spirit with the con-
stant exhortation to man to outdo his neighbor in producing and
consuming superfluous products. In an attack of intense vigor equal
to, if not exceeding, the reaction to social Darwinism, critics plead
for a new spiritually-aware economic system in an evangelistic tone
strikingly similar to the characters in Arthur Koestler's Call Girls;
the cry goes out for "multidimensionality,"17 for Consciousness mI,,8
and for anticonsumption. 9
Skirting these attacks in his work is perfectly consistent with
Dr. Blair's assumptions regarding the continued integrity of the
conventional model. On the other hand, it is likely that had he
confronted some of these controversies, he would have been alerted
to the pertinent compromises carved into the competitive model
that render his set of remedies incomplete.
First trespassed by a phalanx of New Deal legislation, then
subjected to the embellishments of the Fair Deal, the Great Society,
and others, free enterprise now tags precariously in a state of ema-
ciation on the coattails of a market system mongrelized by myriad
instances of public intervention. Recognizing that many of the nor-
16. The leading proponent of this view is J.K. Galbraith. See J. GALBRAITH, THE New
INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967); J. GALBIITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958).
17. W. WEISSKOPF, ALIENATION AND ECONOMICS (1971).
18. C. REICH, THE GREENING OF AMERICA (1970).
19. A. LINDBECK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW LEFT: AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW (1971).
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mal by-products of free enterprise such as temporary unemploy-
ment and corporate bankruptcy generate adverse public reactions
with obvious policitcal ramifications, Congress is in a constant pro-
cess of pacification through laws designed either to soften the self-
correction process or eliminate its causes. The business sector bene-
fits from forms of friendly and supportive legislation while other
laws hedge against unemployment or dislocation. Self-correction is
continually being preempted by plans for dealing with externalities
such as the environment. Likewise, the list of statutory exemptions
from antitrust grows-newspapers today,2" bottle makers tomor-
row.' Non-statutory intervention abounds in the form of regulatory
agency protectionism 22 such as the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion and the trucking industry, restraints couched in not-so-subtle
political pressure, as with the bank lending prime rate, and various
forms of subsidization-one recent example is the Navy's invest-
ment in one of its floundering defense contractors. 2 To compound
present conditions, a new interventionalist constituency is emerging
from the "new" reform groups who advocate a grand design of anti-
establishment governmental intervention.
25
To be sure, Blair is cognizant of the distortive and counter-
productive effects from capricious government intervention. He
condemns the anti-competitive effects of protective tariffs, regula-
tory somnabulism and favoritism, procurement policies that stifle
technology, and counter-productive patent laws. The harmful con-
sequences of his list cannot be disputed. It is, however, a short list
constituting page one of a many-page dossier. Even if Blair's recom-
mendations were followed to the letter, it would be mainly a token
gesture at reviving the old system. Fundamentally at issue-and in
doubt-is the existence of a political will and public support of
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1803 (1970). See Large, Newspapers as a (Favored) Business, Wall
Street Journal, Aug. 4, 1969, at 20, col. 3.
21. Under a bill approved by the Senate soft drink companies are free to establish
exclusive territorial arrangements for the manufacture, distribution and sale of trademarked
soft drink products. N.Y.L.J. 1, (July 16, 1973).
22. See Panel Discussion, Return of the Invisible Hand: The New View of Economic
Regulation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROB. 1 (1972).
23. Wall Street Journal, Oct. 20, 1971, at 4, col. 2.
24. TIME, Jan. 15, 1973, at 70, col. 3.
25. For conflicting views on this see Green and Moore, Winter's Discontent: Market
Failure and Consumer Welfare, 82 YALE L.J. 903 (1973); Green and Nader, Economic Regula-
tion vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, id. at 871; Winter, Economic Regula-
tion vs. Competition: Ralph Nader and Creeping Capitalism, id. at 890.
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sufficient strength to unhinge so many vested interests that have
achieved a self-serving private accomodation with self-correction.
ARTHUR D. AUSTIN*
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. B.S. 1958, University of Virginia;
J.D. 1963, Tulane University.
The Austrian-German Arbitral
Tribunal-A Model for Conflict
Resolution
THE AUSTRIAN-GERMAN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL. Ignaz Seidl-
Hohenveldern. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1972. Pp. xv,
261. Index. $15.00.
A noted Austrian jurist now teaching in Germany feels so
strongly that the two Germanic states have discovered a useful new
procedure for dispute resolution that he has chosen to describe the
system in full, to report and interpret the decisions produced by it,
and to write all of this in English so that the non-Germanic world
can profit by an experience little known outside of Central Europe.
The development of the procedure is difficult to follow because
the circumstances under which it was created are complex. Much
of the explanation relates to the property settlements between Ger-
many and Austria following the Second World War. Under the
Austrian State Treaty, executed in 1955, Austria received from the
Allies the German assets in Austria that the Allies had seized in
victory. In order to prevent a renewed German predominance of the
Austrian economy, Austria pledged in the treaty that the bulk of
these assets would never be returned to German control. While the
Soviet Union demanded payment by Austria for assets it trans-
ferred, the Western powers, including the United States, made their
transfers free of charge. Germany was required to compensate its
own nationals for the property in Austria that they had lost, and
Austria was asked to waive on behalf of itself and its nationals those
claims against Germany arising after German entry into Austria in
1938. The scheme was devised to reduce the possibility of tension
generated by claims crossing state lines.
Despite this effort to reduce conflict, Austria and Germany
foresaw persisting problems in claim settlements, and to settle them
they executed the Property Treaty on June 15, 1957. Both govern-
ments believed it necessary to the future of property ownership in
Europe that the principle of the inviolability of private property be
reaffirmed, but they faced the seemingly contradictory provisions of
the State Treaty under which Austria held large amounts of German
property. To establish a balance between the sanctity of property
and the respect due treaties, the Property Treaty regarded the Ger-
1115
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man assets transferred to Austria as a special fund against which
Austrian small property owners might claim full restoration or reim-
bursement for their losses. Additionally, the treaty provided that
former German owners could require their creditors to proceed
against the fund if, absent the transfer dictated by the State Treaty,
their former Austrian assets would have been available to satisfy
their debts.
A third treaty, the Finance and Compensation Treaty, was ne-
gotiated in 1961 to protect the claims of Austrian creditors against
German pension institutes. Additionally, this treaty provided that
Germany reimburse Eastern European ethnic Germans who were
expelled from their homes at the war's end and who incurred per-
sonal expenses while relocating in Austria.
Both the Property Treaty and the Finance and Compensation
Treaty established Arbitral Tribunals for determining the validity
and amount of the claims-procedures essential whenever claims
are involved. For claims arising under the Finance and Compensa-
tion Treaty, the negotiators relied on a "classic" arbitral tribunal
to which cases could be submitted only by one of the states. In
designing the dispute-settlement provisions of the Property Treaty,
however, the drafters innovated, and it is with this innovation, seen
as a useful model for others to follow, that the author is concerned.
In Dr. Seidl-Hohenveldern's view, the Property Treaty adds to
the arbitral procedure two novel features of dispute resolution: the
creation of a Conciliation Committee through which claims must
filter before reaching arbitration; and the insulation of private
claimants from the arbitral process. The treaty requires that any
private litigant raising questions concerning its provisions submit
the dispute to the Conciliation Committee before instituting pro-
ceedings in any German or Austrian court. This procedure has set-
tled through conciliation rather than through adjudication nine-
tenths of all claims covered by the treaty. If the Conciliation Com-
mittee fails to resolve the dispute, the private litigants are required
to sue in their national courts, and these courts may then seek an
opinion from the Arbitral Tribunal if they think that an interpreta-
tion of the Property Treaty is necessary to resolve the claim. The
Treaty thus assures uniformity in the interpretation of its provi-
sions, focuses the views of undoubted experts on issues raised under
it, and stimulates compliance by domestic courts with international
law under the ultimate supervision of the authorities on the Arbitral
Tribunal. Further, Dr. Seidl-Hohenveldern asserts, this novel pro-
cedure is less offensive to sovereign prerogatives than is the classic
1116 [Vol. 26
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arbitral tribunal: because individuals are not permitted access to
the international tribunal but are limited to suit in domestic courts
from which final enforceable judgments issue in ordinary course, the
Property Treaty offers a valuable face-saving measure.
Experience shows that the work of this unique Arbitral Tri-
bunal has not aroused interstate rivalry. Indeed, on no occasion
have the Austrian and German arbitrators felt it necessary to call
for an umpire to resolve a tie, the procedure permitted in extremis.
While Dr. Seidl-Hohenveldern questions whether this circumstance
resulted from the common language and similar legal systems in
both countries, his presentation of the experience suggests that he
thinks this common ground was unnecessary to the success of the
venture.
Although Dr. Seidl-Hohenveldern urges that the experience of
the Austrian-German Arbitral Tribunal offers for the rest of the
world a new model for resolving disputes between property owners,
his thesis may not withstand critical evaluation. In contrast to our
overburdened court calendars, inevitable delays, high costs, and
resulting injustices, the success of the Tribunal certainly suggests
that we of the West have, perhaps, come to rely too heavily on
litigation as the only means of conflict resolution in our societies.
Nevertheless, parties do not always feel that conciliation is fair
because pressures can be forced upon them to accept less than satis-
factory resolutions. Indeed, some litigants prefer to fight from the
outset and let an impartial judge determine the proper solution.
Conciliation has its attractions, but it is not the panacea it might
at first appear.
Moreover, the Property Treaty's insulation of the private citi-
zen from the final arbiter flies in the face of much current thinking
that would give the individual not only a place in international law
but perhaps even the right to bring suits in the International Court
of Justice. Some jurists and commentators have argued that the
private claimant who must convince a national bureau to intercede
on his behalf is handicapped because that bureau may for political
reasons refuse to present his claim. While domestic courts rather
than bureaucrats isolate the individual in the Austro-German
scheme, even courts-especially those susceptible to the influence
of a Ministry of Justice or a monopolistic political party-are not
always free from political motives. Such arguments do suggest the
value of direct access to the final interpreter of the law.
This reviewer believes that the Austro-German relationship
may be unique and that a conflict resolution procedure modeled on
1973]
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the Property Treaty Arbitral Tribunal might be inappropriate for
countries with different languages and different legal traditions.
The real value of the procedure should first be tested between, per-
haps, two common-law countries where the English language is used
by both the parties and the arbitrators. If it succeeds there, the
model could then be tried with disputants from different cultures,
languages, and legal systems motivated by disparate ideologies.
Whatever the reader concludes concerning the ultimate utility
of the Austro-German procedure for dispute resolution on a world-
wide scale, he must applaud Dr. Seidl-Hohenveldern's treatment of
the subject. Not only is the presentation exhaustive in its explana-
tion of the circumstances under which the experiment was con-
ducted, but the translations of the resulting decisions provide wel-
come additional materials that are necessary in charting develop-
ments in international law. This work certainly supplies valuable
information in an area previously lacking sufficient sources.
JOHN N. HAZARD*
* Professor, Columbia University School of Law. B.A. 1930, Yale University; LL.B.
1934, Harvard University; Cert., 1937, Moscow Juridicial Inst.; J.S.D. 1939, University of
Chicago; LL.D. 1969, University of Freiberg; LL.D. 1970, Lehigh University.
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